Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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By contrast, there is no difference between the dispute initiation rates of democracies and Machines. In Chapter 5, Weeks dismisses diversionary explanations for Argentine behavior leading up to the 1982 Falklands War. It is clear that by that time, civilian leaders knew that their survival in office depended on the support of the military.

He has also authored or coauthored dozens of scholarly and popular publications on international relations and foreign policy. The intellectual depth of the reviewers’ discussions speaks to the magnitude of the contribution of Dictators at War and Peace. By contrast, personalist leaders, both civilian Bosses and military Strongmen, face little prospect of punishment for foreign policy failure, and thus can afford to engage in speculative gambles. It is particularly important for policy makers understand how and why certain dictatorships are more prone to war and less competent at it than their democratic counterparts. On the more general side, Hein Goemans argues that all regimes vary along two dimensions—the risk versus the cost of removal from office a leader faces for foreign policy failure—and that different combinations of these two variables determine leaders’ decisions to initiate war as well as their wartime behavior.His second book, Leaders and International Conflict, co-authored with Giacomo Chiozza, was published by Cambridge University Press (2011) and focuses on the role of leaders in war initiation.

A production of H-Diplo with the journals Security Studies, International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, and the International Studies Association’s Security Studies Section (ISSS). A recent literature argues that the initiation of a crisis is a poor proxy for threats [31]Moreover, it is not clear that the outcome of ouster means that the audience punishes the leader for failing to carry through on a threat. Similarly, I agree with Weisiger’s comment that future scholarship should analyze whether the results are robust to controlling for possible confounding variables beyond those I studied. Although this approach is common in the literature, [30] it puts a lot of weight on un-modeled common shocks that would push a regime type over the edge into conflict initiation and ignores the potential that a different regime type might not have experienced such a shock in the first place.All told, then, even if the Junta’s strategy was risky, it was not unreasonable to believe that when confronted with a bloodless fait accompli the British government would simply walk away, while any attempts at a diplomatic resolution would likely be frustrated by the British government’s refusal to force a transfer on the reluctant islanders. As German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow famously remarked about the Schlieffen Plan’s intended attack on neutral Belgium, “if the Chief of Staff, especially a strategic authority such as Schlieffen, believes such a measure to be necessary, then it is the obligation of diplomacy to adjust to it and prepare for it in every possible way. With a good review of extant literature and innovative data-based and case studies on regime types and conflict behavior, she examines theories that distinguish between authoritarian leaders who nevertheless answer to significant elite constituencies and those who behave like unrestrained 'bosses' or 'strongmen'. Consideration of civil-military relations, however, might have caused her to differentiate further among civilian-led regimes according to whether they face a civilian or a military audience, and identify those that are more and less prone to conflict. Between Machines and Juntas, the latter are somewhat more conflict-prone and likely to lose wars because the military background of the leader and the audience create a more permissive environment for the use of force.



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